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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ] 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
CLARK CLINIC CORPORATION, ] 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
> APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) No. 20105 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by Zions Bank against Clark Clinic 
to collect on a promissory note executed by an employee of 
Appellant Clark Clinic Corporation, using the facsimile 
signature stamps of the officers of Clark Clinic Corporation. 
Clark Clinic Corporation counterclaimed against Zions Bank to 
recover funds it alleged were wrongfully disbursed from Clark!s 
checking account on stamped facsimile signatures and checks 
cashed on unauthorized endorsements. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court on September 30, 1982, granted Summary 
Judgment for respondent, dismissing Clark Clinic Corporation's 
counterclaim. The Court entered a pre-trial Order in Limine 
precluding Clark Clinic from putting on relevant and necessary 
evidence at trial. Finally, the Court granted Summary Judgment 
for respondent Zions Bank on its first cause of action. Appeal 
is taken from these decisions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Clark Clinic Corporation seeks reversal of the judgments 
appealed from as a matter of law. Clark asks for judgment in 
its favor as a matter of law or, that failing, that this action 
be remanded to the district court for trial on all issues. 
FACTS AND PARTIES 
Defendant and appellant Clark Clinic Corporation (herein-
after "Clark") had a business checking account at plaintiff/ 
respondent's (hereinafter "Bank") Provo office. The signature 
card contract on file with the Bank required two manual 
signatures; that of Richard S. Clark, S.N. Clark, S.M. Clark, or 
R. Craig Clark, in order to validate a check on that account. 
(Record on appeal at 18). 
Beginning about January, 1978, and unknown to Clark!s 
principals, Clark's employee and business manager Robert N. 
Westover (hereinafter "Westover"), began using signature stamps 
to draw checks on Clark's Corporate checking account. (Record 
at 19). The facsimile signature stamps had been made to endorse 
medical insurance forms (Affidavit of Robert N. Westover, page 
54 lines 14-25) and there was no authorization for the bank to 
honor checks drawn with facsimile stamps. (Record at 39). 
Clark's officers continued to draw checks on the corporate 
(-2-) 
account with manual signatures. 
Westover was only authorized to stamp checks "for deposit 
only" and deposit them to the corporate and partnership 
accounts. (Record at 283 paragraph 8, Record at 287 paragraph 
8, Record at 291 paragraph 8, Westover, supra, at 53 lines 1-8). 
The Clark Clinic Corporation does business out of a build-
ing owned by Clark Clinic, a partnership. Clark paid rent of 
$1,200.00 per month for the use of the medical suite. During 
the time this suit arose, the officers of Clark would draw and 
manually sign corporate checks payable to the order of Clark 
Clinic, a partnership which had its account at another bank. 
Westover would endorse these checks and Zions Bank would cash 
them. Westover was not authorized to endorse and cash partner-
ship nor corporate checks. (Westover, supra, at 21 line 13 to 
page 26 line 13; Record at 283 paragraph 4, Record at 287 
paragraph 4, Record at 291 paragraph 4). 
Over the next several months, and unknown to Clark's 
principals, Clark's account was run into a cronic overdraft 
state of approximately $20,000.00. (Record at 12 line 24 to 
page 13 line 24; Record at 383, Deposition of Arnold W. Brown 
page 11 line 2 to page 12 line 8). This had never happened 
during the relationship between Clark and Bank (Record at 383 p. 
32 lines 5-9), and Clark had never authorized the Bank to 
overdraft its account. 
An officer of Bank, Mr. Brown, recommended to Westover that 
(-3-) 
Clark should take out a loan in order to clear up the overdraft. 
Clark had never taken out a loan before. (Record at 383, page 
11 line 12 to page 12 line 18). Westover then used the 
facsimile stamps to execute a corporate resolution authorizing a 
corporate loan, stamped personal financial statements and per-
sonal guarantees of the officers of Clark; Westover then used 
the facsimile stamps to execute a promissory note for 
$25,000.00, in favor of Bank and on behalf of Clark and the Bank 
deposited the money to Clarkfs account. (Record at 383 page 12 
line 12 to page 14 line 20). The proceeds of the note were then 
disbursed from Clark's account on checks drawn with unauthorized 
signatures. (Record at 288 paragraph 12, Record at 284 paragraph 
12, Record at 292 paragraph 12). 
Clark, through its officers and directors, did not become 
aware of the loan until October, 1978. (Westover, supra, at 27 
lines 12-20). At that time Westoverfs employment had been 
terminated and Clark's account was again in overdraft. Clark 
had no operating capital and had to use accounts receivable to 
cover its overdraft and close out its account with Bank. (Record 
at 284 paragraph 10, Record at 288 paragraph 10, Record at 292 
paragraph 10). At that time Bank demanded payment on the 
promissory note from Clark and Clark expressly repudiated the 
note on the grounds that it was executed without authority, 
Clark did not know of the borrowing and Clark did not have the 
proceeds from the note to return. (Id.) 
(-4-) 
The Bank filed suit for recovery on the note seeking 
principle, contract interest (prime plus 5% for default), and 
attorney's fees. (Record at 13 et seq.). The District Court 
granted Summary Judgment on that issue, holding in part: "...the 
extent of the agent's authority is not controlling nor 
material." (Record at 346). 
Just after Clark became aware of the promissory note, it 
also discovered the checks drawn with stamped signatures of its 
Officers and the checks cashed with unauthorized endorsements. 
Clark counterclaimed on that theory. (Record at 18-23). The 
question of what became of the missing funds has never been 
reached in this action. The Court granted Summary Judgment 
dismissing the Counterclaim, holding: 
1. In this matter the Court finds that the 
stamped signatures on the checks paid by the plaintiff 
Bank are within the purview of the requirements of the 
signature card contract between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. 
2. There is now no dispute that the stamped 
signatures were placed on the checks by the 
defendant's fiduciary. 
3. The bank is not obligated to inquire into 
whether the fiduciary is honest or whether he is 
acting within the scope of his employment. 
4. The Court finds the Sugarhouse Finance 
Company case cited in plaintiff's Memorandum 
applicable to the facts now before the Court and the 
bank is not guilty of lack of due care in paying the 
checks in question when considered in light of the 
facts before the Court, the Sugarhouse Finance Company 
case, and applicable sections of the Utah Commercial 
Code. 
Accordingly the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
(-5-) 
O R D E R 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted and defendant's Counterclaim is hereby 
dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIM 
A. STAMPED FACSIMILE SIGNATURES USED WITHOUT AUTHORITY ARE 
NOT VALID SIGNATURES UNDER THE SIGNATURE CARD CONTRACT BETWEEN 
THE BANK AND CLARK CLINIC CORPORATION. 
The basic question raised by this case is, simply, what is 
the nature of a stamped signature used without authority. In 
the context of a checking account, a stamped signature does not 
validate a check. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a bank 
deals with its depositors' funds as a fiduciary. See 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 U.2d 370, 384 P.2d 
796 (1963). The signature card creating a bank deposit is a 
contract between the Bank and its depositor and is entitled to 
the same binding effect as any other contract. McCullough v. 
Wasserback, 30 U.2d 398, 518 P2d 691, (1974). 
Chief Justice Crockett speaking for a unamimous Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Where a depositor has placed money in a checking 
account to be disbursed on his order the bank requires 
that he fill out a card bearing the authorized 
signature, or signatures, upon which checks will be 
paid; and the only protection the depositor has is his 
reliance on the universally accepted practice and rule 
of law based thereon that the drawee is obliged to 
know the signature of its depositor and pay out his 
money only on his order and when the signature is 
authorized and genuine. 
(-6-) 
W.P. Harlin const. Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 23 U. 2d 
422, 464 P. 2d 585 (1970), at 588 
Oklahoma has a similar rule, that "A Bank upon which a 
depositor therein draws a check is charged with knowledge of the 
depositor's signature." First National Bank of McAlester v. 
Mann, 410 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1966). They have stated the general 
common law rule as follows: 
A bank upon which a depositor therein draws a 
check is charged with knowledge of the depositor's 
signature. 
Where a signature to a bank check is forged or 
made without authority of the person whose signature 
it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no 
right to enforce payment thereof can be acquired 
through or under such signature, ... . 
The written agreement of the parties provides for two 
manual signatures of Richard S. Clark, R. Craig Clark, S.N. 
Clark, or S.M. Clark. There was never any authorization for the 
Bank to pay out Clark's money on stamped signatures. Even the 
Bank's own officer testified: 
Q Wouldn't you have a copy of the facsimile stamp that 
was supposed to be used on an authorization card? 
A I would think so. We would have to have that. 
Therefore, since the Bank had no authorization to honor 
stamped facsimile signatures on Clark's checks, the Court erred 
as a matter of law in determining that the stamped signatures 
were "within the purview of the signature card contract between 
the plaintiff and defendant." 
Id., Quoting from Maurmair v. National Bank of Commerce 
of Tulsa, 165 P. 413, and Negim v. First State Bank of Picher, 
149 P.2d 763. 
o 
^Record at 384, Deposition of J. Ross Nielsen page 12 
lines 21-24. 
(-7-) 
B. STAMPED SIGNATURES ARE INVALID UNLESS AUTHORIZED 
The Bank has stated that legal support for its position can 
be found in the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 70A-1-201(39), which provides that "signed" includes any 
symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to 
authenticate a writing." Section 70A-3-401 provides: "A sig-
nature is made by use of any name, including any trade or 
assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used in 
lieu of a written signature." 
This argument fails since the principals of Clark never 
intended facsimile stamps to be authentic signatures on their 
checks and the Bank was on actual notice of the authorized 
signatures pursuant to the signature card contract with Clark. 
Furthermore, the question of the validity of stamped 
signatures used without authority has been addressed before by 
the courts. The courts have consistently held that unauthorized 
stamped signatures or indorsements are not valid signatures. 
C. THE SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY CASE AND THE UNIFORM 
FIDUCIARIES ACT ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT 
The District Court granted summary judgment dismissing 
3Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Helper State Bank, Kan . App., 
630 P.2d 721 (1981), Robb v. Pennsylvania Co., 40 A. 969, 
Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Pacific Nat. Bank, Wash. App., 587 
P.2d 617 (1978), 10 Am Jur 2d §607 at 570. 
The case cited to the District Court was Menke v. Board of 
Education, Independent School District of West Burlington, 211 
N.W. 2d 601 (Iowa 1973). The court in Menke held that "Rubber 
stamps may be easily copied and secured with facility, and 
fraudulent certification accomplished by the use therreof would 
be detrimental to the interests of a bank (Clark in the case now 
before the Court). 
(-8-) 
Clark's counterclaim. The Court justified this dismissal under 
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act as interpreted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Zions First 
National Bank, 21 U.2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968). The Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act is not applicable to these facts for the simple 
reason that Westover (Clark's business manager) was not 
authorized to sign checks on Clark's account, nor was he 
authorized to indorse and cash checks made payable to Clark 
Clinic, a partnership. 
In extensive research by this office, we have found no 
cases applying the Uniform Fiduciaries Act wherein the fiduciary 
was not a signatory to the account or authorized to endorse 
^THE UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES ACT, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended) §22-1-1 et seq. is not applicable to the facts before 
the Court. The various sections of the act provide immunity to 
the Bank when dealing with fiduciaries and trust funds. 
§22-1-2 does not apply to the improper endorsements since 
it provides: Payments made to fiduciaries.—A person, who in 
good faith pays or transfers to a fiduciary any money or other 
property which the fiduciary as such is authorized to receive, 
..." Clark has consistently alleged that Westover was not 
authorized to receive funds or endorse and cash its checks. 
§22-1-4 requires: ,!. . .a fiduciary empowered to endorse 
such instrument on behalf of his principal ..." 
§22-1-5 provides: Checks—Drawn by fiduciaries, payable to 
third persons.—If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by 
a fiducairy as such, or in the name of his principal by a 
fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name of his 
principal, the payee is not bound to inquire whether the 
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation ...!! 
§22-1-6 requires: "...a fiduciary empowered to draw such 
instrument in the name of his principal, ...n 
§22-1-8 requires: Tf...a fiduciary empowered to draw checks 
upon his principal's account,..." 
(-9-) 
checks, or entrusted with certain property. In this case, 
Westover was not a signatory on Clark's account. Utah Code 
Annotated 70A-3-403, provides that one who signs without 
authority is personally liable on the instrument. 
Respondent Zions Bank was the actual and statutory 
fiduciary with regard to Clark's bank account, along with the 
officers and directors of Clark, who were signatories authorized 
to withdraw funds from the account. Westover was never 
authorized by the Officers of Defendant to withdraw funds from 
the account, nor to sign checks. (See Record at 282, 286, and 
290; affidavits of Richard S. Clark, R. Craig Clark and Stanly 
N. Clark), therefore, The Uniform Fiduciaries Act does not apply 
to the facts before the Court, or at least it becomes a disputed 
question of fact which must be resolved in Clark's favor for the 
purpose of Summary Judgment. 
The court has held that plaintiff Bank was not guilty of 
lack of due care in paying checks on defendant's bank account. 
Whether or not a bank acted in a commercially reasonable 
manner is a question of fact. Aetna, note 3, supra at 728. See 
also, Utah Code Annotated 70A-3-419(l)(c). Since Clark contends 
°0ne who is authorized by his employer to sign checks on 
his employer's account or is expressly entrusted with property 
is a fiduciary within the terms of the act. See: Johnson v. 
Citizens National Bank of Decatur, 334 N.E.2d 295, Smith v. 
Halverson, 273 N.W.2d 146 (S.D. 1978), Roswell State Bank v. 
Lawrence Walker Cotton Co., 240 P.2d 1143, Valley National Bank 
v. American Employers Ins. Co., 138 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1943), Board 
of County Com'rs v. First National Bank, 368 P.2d 132 (Wyo. 
1962), Guild v. First Nat'1. Bank of Nevada, 553 P.2d 955 (Nev. 
1976), Transport Trucking Co. v. First Nat'1. Bank, 300 P.2d 
476 (N.M. 1976), Movie Films Inc. v. First Security Bank of 
Utah, N.A., 447 P.2d 38, Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Zions 
First National Bank, 440 P.2d 869 (UT. 1968), 5A Michie on Banks 
and Banking, p. 172, (1973). 
(-10-) 
that the Bank was negligent, this question of fact must be 
resolved in favor of Clark for the purpose of summary judgment. 
If the Bank was negligent, then it is guilty of conversion and 
Clark is entitled to a return of the money. (Utah code Annotated 
70A-3-404). 
POINT 2: 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING 
THE BANK'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
On or about the 1st day of August, 1983, in this matter, in 
the Fourth District Court of Utah County, the Court made and 
entered an Order in Limine as follows: 
1. Defendant is prohibited from putting on 
evidence at trial on the issue of whether defendant's 
fiduciary had authority to issue checks or whether 
plaintiff was negligent in accepting checks with 
stamped signatures, those issues have been previously 
determined by this Court in favor of plaintiff. 
2. Defendant is prohibited from putting on 
evidence at trial on the issue of whether its fiduciary 
had authority to bind it on the promissory note herein 
or whether plaintiff failed to ascertain the limits of 
defendant's fiduciary's authority for the reason that 
defendant has ratified the acts of its agent, Robert N. 
Westover, in executing the promissory note herein. Or 
alternatively, that Robert N. Westover acted within his 
apparent or implied authority in his actions in dealing 
with the said promissory note herein. 
3. Defendant is prohibited from presenting any 
evidence at trial on the issues of the disbursement of 
funds from its checking account and whether a benefit 
was or was not conferred on defendant by the promissory 
note herein. 
The issue of disbursement of funds from Clark's checking 
account has been dealt with in part one (1) of this brief. It 
becomes a question of fact in this instance because the Bank 
included in its first amended complaint two additional causes of 
(-11-) 
action. The plaintiff/Bank1s second cause of action was for 
overdraft repayment and its third cause of action was for "unjust 
enrichment." (Record on Appeal at 13, 14, and 15). 
For the Bank to prevail on either of its alternative causes 
of action, it had to put on evidence of the checking account 
relationship, or in the alternative, evidence that Clark had 
benefitted from the proceeds of the note. 
The Bank's third cause of action was for "unjust 
enrichment," and is based on the theory that Bank deposited into 
Clark's account the sum sued on, being $25,000.00. In order to 
prevail on this theory the Bank had to ordinarily prove that the 
money was given to Clark not pursuant to a written agreement. 
Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978). 
In restitution the measure of damages is not the amount the 
Bank deposited to Clark's account, but rather the benefit 
conferred upon Clark by Bank's act. Baugh v. Parley, 184 P.2d 
335 (Utah 1974). 
Therefore, the court erred as a matter of Law in entering 
the Order in Limine, since it allowed the Bank to put on evidence 
that Clark received a "benefit" and precluded Clark from putting 
on any evidence that no benefit was retained or conferred upon 
Clark. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT 
IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF/BANK1S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(-12-) 
A. CLARK'S EMPLOYEE, WESTOVER, DID NOT HAVE ANY AUTHORITY 
TO BORROW MONEY OR EXECUTE A PROMISSORY NOTE ON BEHALF OF CLARK 
CLINIC CORPORATION. 
In order for the Bank to prevail on its first cause of 
action, it had to establish that Westover was an agent of Clark 
with the authority to borrow money on behalf of Clark. Clark is 
a corporation and as such can act only through its officers and 
employees, who are its agents. The acts and omissions of an 
agent, done within the scope of his authority, are, in contem-
plation of the law, the acts and omissions of the corporation 
whose agent he is. Jury Instruction forms, Utah 10.4; Carlquist 
v. Quayle, 62 Utah 266, 218 P. 729. 
Authorization for an agency may be express or it may be 
implied, or the unauthorized act of an agent may be ratified by 
the principal. 
The authority is express when it is given explicitly, 
either in writing or orally. Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 
169. There is absolutely no fact or allegation that express 
authority existed in this case. There was no express authority 
for Westover to borrow money. The Bank contends that it relies 
on either implied (or apparent) authority, or ratification by 
Clark. 
B. THE BANK MAY NOT RELY ON THE THEORY THAT WESTOVER HAD 
THE IMPLIED AUTHORITY TO BORROW MONEY ON BEHALF OF CLARK. 
It is established beyond any conceivable question that one 
who deals with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain the 
(-13-) 
agents authority, and that the burden of proving agency rests 
upon the party who asserts it. See Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P. 
2d 74, (Utah 1982); Nalia v. Giles, 100 U. 562, 114 P.2d 208 
(1941); Dohrmann Hotel Supply Company v. Beau Brummel, Inc., 99 
Utah 188, 103 P.2d 650 (1940); True v. Hi-Plains Elevator 
Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1978); Seattle-First Nat. 
Bank v. Pacific Nat. Bank of Washington, 587 P.2d 617 (Wash. 
1978). 
It is hornbook law that a party who seeks to bind a 
principal with acts of an agent in borrowing money, as 
distinguished from other acts, has the burden of proving the 
express authority of the agent to borrow money and may not rely 
on implied authority. 3 Am. Jur 2d §88. 
§74. WHEN AUTHORITY IS INFERRED 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is not authorized to 
borrow unless such borrowing is usually incident to 
the performance of acts which he is authorized to 
perform for the principal. 
Restatement, Agency (2d ed) §74 
The depositions taken in this case establish that Clark 
Clinic Corporation had never taken out a loan before this 
instance. (Record at 384, Deposition of J. Ross Nielsen page 4 
line 18 to page 5 line 11. Record at 383, Deposition of Arnold 
W. Brown page 4 line 5 to line 9. Deposition of Robert N. 
Westover, page 8 line 11 to line 15). 
The affidavits of the officers and employees of Clark are 
consistent with this. (Record at 287, 288 paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 
and 15. Record at 291, 292 paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 15. Record 
(-14-) 
at 295 paragraph 2). Clark had never taken out a loan before, 
an<J the Corporation had never authorized any corporate borrowing. 
Borrowing was not usual and incident to the performance of 
any duties expected or authorized for the business manager of 
Clark to perform. (Record on appeal at 295, Affidavit of Ray H. 
Ivie past business manager of Clark Clinic). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently set forth the standards 
for apparent or implied authority in the case of City Electric 
v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth, No. 18248, Decided October 12, 
1983, U. 2d , P. 2d . This Court held: 
Where corporate liability is sought for acts of 
its agent under apparent authority, liability is 
premised upon the corporation's knowledge of and 
acquiesence in the conduct of its agent which led 
third parties to rely upon the agent's actions, 
[citations omitted] Nor is the authority of the agent 
"apparent" merely because it looks so to the person 
with whom he deals. 
Plaintifffs claim that it relied upon the implied or 
apparent authority of Robert N. Westover is premised solely upon 
the actions of Westover and Mr. Brown's own perception of the 
situation. Mr. Brown testified in his deposition that when he 
proposed a loan to "Bob," Westover said he would have to check 
with the "Doctors." (Record at 383). Further Mr. Brown 
testified that he personally tried to contact the principals of 
Clark prior to the loan without success. (Id) . (Contested 
fact, See Affidavits of Officers and Suzy Odle, Record at 285, 
289, 293 and 298). 
Since questions of fact exist as to the apparent agency of 
Westover, the Court erred as a matter of fact in granting 
(-15-) 
Summary Judgment on this issue. If the facts are decided in 
favor of Clark, as they must be in a Summary Judgment case, 
[Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 U. 2d 420, 413 P. 2d 
807 (1966)] then the Court erred as a matter of law in granting 
Summary Judgment for the Bank. There is no apparent or implied 
authority in this case. 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT CLARK RATIF-
IED THE ACTIONS OF WESTOVER IN BORROWING MONEY FROM THE BANK, 
The legal doctrine of ratification arises from the un-
authorized act of an agent. City Electric v. Dean Evans 
Chrysler-Plymouth, supra. 
Ratification: 
In the law of principal and agent, the adoption 
and confirmation by one person with knowledge of all 
material facts, of an act or contract performed or 
entered into in his behalf by another who at the time 
assumed without authority to act as his agent. 
Black1s, supra at 1428. 
At the time Clark became aware of the promissory note 
executed by its employee, the officers of Clark met with 
officers of Bank and expressly repudiated the note being sued on 
herein. (Record at 284 paragraph 11, Record at 288 paragraph 
11, Record at 292 paragraph 11). 
The putting of proceeds into Clark's checking account, in 
the absence of other elements is not enough to establish a 
ratification on the part of Clark. There are certain other 
formalities necessary in order to ratify a contract entered into 
by an agent without authority to do so. 
(-16-) 
It has been held that a principal was not liable on a 
promissory note executed by his agent without authority for the 
reason that receipt of the money did not constitute a 
ratification of the loan because the principal did not know of 
the borrowing. Calhoun v. McCrory Piano & Realty Co., 129 Tenn. 
651, 168 SW 149. It was established in a subsequent case, Duffy 
v. Scott, 129 ALR 487, 235 Wis. 142, 292 NW 273, that an action 
would lie on such facts for unjust enrichment. 
Ratification further requires certain formalities. Since 
it is the equivalent of prior authority, the ratification of an 
unauthorized act must be of the particular mode or form 
necessary to confer authority to perform it in the first place. 
114 ALR 996. Rest. Agency 2d §93. Ratification must, to bind 
the principal, be in writing if the original authorization was 
required to be in writing. ALR supra. Therefore the Bank must 
prove that Clark has ratified the unauthorized act of borrowing 
money by formal corporate resolution. No such proof has been 
made. 
A ratification of an agent's acts requires a principal to 
have knowledge of all material facts and an intent to ratify. In 
order to enforce an agreement, the same kind of authorization 
that is required to clothe an agent initially with authority to 
contract must be given by the principal to constitute a 
ratification of the unauthorized act. Where the law requires 
the authority to be given in writing, the ratification must also 
generally be in writing. Bradshaw v. McBride, supra. 
(-17-) 
Nor does the mere acceptance of benefits establish a 
ratification of the unauthorized borrowing. In order to have a 
ratification effected by the receipt of benefits, the benefit 
must be ascertainable and direct. Bankers Protective Life Ins. 
Co. v. Addison, (Tex. Civ. App.) 237 SW 2d 694. In this case 
any benefit is questionable at best. 
Finally, there can be no ratification by retention of 
benefits where, at the time the principal acquires the necessary 
knowledge, and without its fault, conditions are such that it 
cannot be placed in status quo or repudiate the entire 
transaction without loss. Newco Land Co. v. Martin, 358 Mo. 99, 
213 SW2d 694. In other words, the requirement as to the return 
of the benefits received in order to avoid ratification will not 
apply where it is not possible for the principal to return the 
benefits. Farmers State Bank v. Haun, 30 Wyo. 322, 222 P. 45. 
Rest. Agency 2d §99. In this case it was not possible to return 
to proceeds of the promissory note. (Record at 283 paragraph 
10). 
When facts pertaining to the existence or nonexistence of 
an agency are conflicting, or conflicting inferences may be 
drawn from the evidence, the question presented is one of fact 
for the jury. 19 ALR 2d 1248, 289 P. 2d 621, §359 Am. Jur. n. 
16, United States Bond & Finance Corp. v. National Bldg. & L. 
Asso., 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 758, 17 P.2d 238. (In a case where 
the evidence is conflicting, or a different reasonable inference 
may be drawn from the evidence, the question of the nature and 
(-18-) 
extent of the authority of an agent is one of fact to be 
determined by the trier of facts). Therefore, it was improper 
in this case to grant summary judgment with facts in issue. 
Clark has been, in essence, denied its day in court and the 
opportunity to defend itself and recover the losses it incurred 
due to the Bank's breach of its fiduciary duties. 
Thus, at least five factual issues still exist: 1. Was a 
benefit retained by Clark? [Question of fact for the jury, 
Ercanbrack v. Crandall-Walker Motor Company, 550 P. 2d 723 at 
775 (Utah 1976)] 2. Could the benefit have been returned to 
the Bank without loss to Clark? [3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency §177; 
Restatement, Agency §99, Official Comment c ] 3. Was Clark 
effective in repudiating the promissory note? 4. Did 
Westover's use of the facsimile stamps constitute "Forgery,11 if 
so the act was unlawful and not capable of ratification. [ See 
Lowe v. April Industries, 531 P. 2d 1297 at 1298 (Utah 1974)]. 
5. Was the borrowing of money "usual and incident" to the 
performance of the duties Westover was expressly authorized to 
perform? (A disputed question of fact). 
CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment was improperly granted in this case, both 
as to Clark Clinic Corporation's Counterclaim, and as to Zions 
Bank's first cause of action. In granting Summary Judgment 
dismissing Clark's Counterclaim, the Court failed even to 
address the checks totaling over $12,500.00 which had been 
endorsed and cashed by Westover. 
(-19-) 
Robert N. Westover admitted in his deposition that he was 
not authorized to endorse or draw checks, nor to borrow money on 
the credit of Clark Clinic Corporation. Arnold Brown, the 
Bank's officer, admitted that Westover was not an authorized 
signature on the account of Clark and the authorized signatures 
were all manual signatures. All parties agree that Clark had 
never borrowed money before, that the funds were "spent" before 
Clark's officers were aware of the loan, and that Clark's 
officers expressly repudiated the loan transaction on the 
grounds the loan was unauthorized and that they did not have the 
money to return. 
Therefore, the Court erred as a matter of law and fact in 
granting summary judgment herein and Clark Clinic corporation is 
entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law on all 
issues. In the alternative, numerous factual issues remain in 
dispute and should be left to the sound discretion of a jury as 
the trier of fact. 
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